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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-1555 
__________ 
 
LEO TARR, 
 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PITTSBURGH, a municipal corporation;  
ANTONIO RUIZ, individually; GLENN CUMMINS, individually 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-01424) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mark R. Hornak 
____________________________________ 
 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 27, 2019 
 
Before:  SHWARTZ, RESTREPO and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 21, 2020) 
___________ 
 
OP I N I O N* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Leo Tarr appeals pro se from an order of the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment in a civil rights case brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  We will affirm the 
District Court’s judgment.   
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we will recite only the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  In October 2015, Tarr called 911 to report that his next door 
neighbor, James Montgomery, had hit him in the head with a brick.  Officer Antonio 
Ruiz, along with several other police officers from the City of Pittsburgh, responded.  
After investigating, Officer Ruiz prepared an affidavit of probable cause for Tarr’s arrest 
on charges of aggravated assault and harassment.  Tarr was arrested pursuant to an 
authorized arrest warrant, but the charges were later dismissed.   
Tarr, with the assistance of counsel, filed a complaint, which he later amended.  In 
the operative second amended complaint, he raised claims of, inter alia, false arrest and 
malicious prosecution against Officer Ruiz.1  Officer Ruiz filed a motion for summary 
judgment, arguing, inter alia, that there was probable cause for Tarr’s arrest.  The District 
Court agreed with Tarr that Officer Ruiz recklessly omitted facts from, and 
misrepresented information within, the affidavit.  But the District Court concluded that 
the affidavit, reconstructed to correct those errors, still established probable cause for 
                                              
1 Tarr also named as defendants Officer Glenn Cummins and the City of Pittsburgh, but 
he later stipulated to the dismissal of those defendants. 
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Tarr’s arrest and prosecution.2  Accordingly, the District Court granted Officer Ruiz’s 
motion for summary judgment.  Tarr appealed pro se.   
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s order granting summary judgment.  See Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 
260 F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir. 2001).  Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in 
favor of that party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher v. County 
of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir. 2006).  A genuine dispute of material fact exists 
if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the non-
moving party.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).    
 To prevail on his false arrest and malicious prosecutions claims, Tarr must 
establish that his arrest was not supported by probable cause.  See Dowling v. City of 
Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that “[t]he proper inquiry in a § 1983 
claim based on false arrest . . . is not whether the person arrested in fact committed the 
offense but whether the arresting officers had probable cause to believe the person 
arrested had committed the offense.”); Wright v. City of Phila., 409 F.3d 595, 604 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (explaining that “[t]o prevail on [a malicious prosecution] claim, [the plaintiff] 
must show that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest her”).  “Probable cause exists 
                                              
2 The District Court also held that Officer Ruiz was entitled to qualified immunity.  Given 
our conclusion below that Tarr failed to make out a constitutional violation, we need not 
decide whether Officer Ruiz is otherwise entitled to qualified immunity.   
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where the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient 
to warrant a reasonable person to believe an offense had been committed.”  United States 
v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 342 (3d Cir. 1992).  In general, “the question of probable 
cause in a section 1983 damage suit is one for the jury.”  Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 
F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1998).  A district court, however, may conclude that probable 
cause exists as a matter of law and grant summary judgment if the evidence, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would not reasonably support a 
contrary factual finding.  See Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997). 
Where, as here, an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant, “[a] plaintiff may succeed 
in a § 1983 action for false arrest . . . if [he] shows, by a preponderance of the evidence:  
(1) that the police officer ‘knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the 
truth, made false statements or omissions that create a falsehood in applying for a 
warrant;’ and (2) that ‘such statements or omissions are material, or necessary, to the 
finding of probable cause.’”  Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(quoting Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 399).  The District Court properly concluded that Officer 
Ruiz recklessly omitted and misstated facts in the probable cause affidavit.3  
Consequently, the District Court performed a word-by-word reconstruction of the 
                                              
3 In particular, the District Court held that the probable cause affidavit (1) “falsely 
state[d] that [Tarr’s] head injury was self-inflicted from hitting his head on a retaining 
wall” and (2) omitted: (a) a summary of what Tarr reported in the 911 call; (b) a witness 
statement suggesting that Montgomery was the aggressor and Tarr was acting in self-
defense; (c) the fact that Officer Ruiz did not inspect the retaining wall where Tarr 
allegedly hit his head; and (d) the fact that the altercation took place on Tarr’s property. 
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affidavit and then reassessed the probable cause determination.  See Dempsey v. 
Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 470 (3d Cir. 2016).  When reconstructed to account for 
those omissions and misstatements, the probable cause affidavit read: 
On 10/26/2015, at 1241 hours Leo Tarr called 911 to report that his neighbor, 
James Montgomery, assaulted him with a brick and reported that he is bleeding 
profusely.  At 1300 hours, I, PO Antonio Ruiz was dispatched to [] Lakewood 
Street for a reported assault in progress.  Upon arrival [five other police officers] 
were on scene with actor/victim separated.  I first spoke with [James] 
Montgomery, resident of [] Lakewood Street.  Montgomery told me [that] shortly 
before Officers arrived, he was confronted by his neighbor from [] Lakewood, Leo 
Tarr.  Montgomery told me that he and Tarr had a verbal altercation over a parking 
spot.  Montgomery told me Tarr lunged at him with a brick, attempting to strike 
him with it. Montgomery, fearing for his safety, told me he pushed Tarr off of 
him, acting in self defense [sic].  When Montgomery pushed Tarr away from his 
person, Montgomery told me Tarr fell backward and struck his head on a retaining 
wall on Tarr’s property. I did not examine the retaining wall. 
 
Montgomery reported Tarr lunged at him a second time, again with a brick, 
attempting to strike him.  Montgomery, fearing for his safety, told me he pushed 
Tarr away in self defense [sic].  Montgomery told me after pushing Tarr away the 
second time, he ran into his home. 
 
I spoke [with] Robert Rizzo, and John Bailey who witnessed the altercation while 
doing construction work across the street.  Rizzo did not see the altercation begin 
but described both men as aggressors swinging at each other.  Rizzo saw an object 
in Tarr’s hand but could not identify it.  Rizzo reported that the fight ended when 
Montgomery hit Tarr in the head with a brick on Tarr’s porch. 
 
City Medic 3 transported Tarr to Mercy Hospital for further treatment.  
Montgomery was not injured during the altercation, but expressed concern for his 
safety, as the actor is his next door [sic] neighbor. 
 
Due to the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident, I will request for the 
arrest of Leo Tarr. 
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We agree that this “‘corrected’ warrant affidavit . . . establish[ed] probable cause” 
to arrest Tarr for aggravated assault and harassment.4  Wilson, 212 F.3d at 789.  Under 
Pennsylvania law, “[a] person is guilty of aggravated assault if he[,]” inter alia, “attempts 
to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly 
weapon.”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2702(a)(4).  In addition, “a person commits the 
crime of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another, the person[,]” 
inter alia, “strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects the other person to physical 
contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same[.]”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2709(a)(1).   
Here, the warrant affidavit contained statements from a witness, Rizzo, who saw 
the altercation from across the street.  Rizzo stated that Tarr, who had an object in his 
hand, swung at Montgomery.  In addition, Montgomery told Officer Ruiz that Tarr was 
the initial aggressor and that Tarr lunged at Montgomery twice with a brick in an attempt 
                                              
4 Tarr takes issue with several aspects of the reconstructed affidavit.  For instance, he 
alleges that it should have omitted all of Montgomery’s statements to the police.  But 
Tarr has not demonstrated that inclusion of those statements was improper.  In fact, 
contrary to Tarr’s belief, omission of Montgomery’s statements likely would have 
constituted a reckless disregard for the truth.  See Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 468 (stating that 
“we [cannot] exclude from the probable cause analysis unfavorable facts an officer 
otherwise would have been able to consider”).  Tarr also asserts that additional details 
should have been incorporated into the affidavit.  In particular, Tarr claims that the 
affidavit should have noted that “prior to the attack he was taking pictures of 
Montgomery over a court dispute regarding parking,” that “a physical altercation . . . 
initially occurred on the lawn of Tarr’s property,” and that “Montgomery . . . hit Tarr 
over the head a second time.”  Notably, though, the corrected affidavit already 
acknowledged that the initial dispute was over a parking spot, that the altercation took 
place on Tarr’s property, and that Montgomery had hit Tarr with a brick.  Thus, the 
inclusion of the details identified by Tarr “would not be sufficient to prevent a fact-finder 
from concluding that the reconstructed affidavit still established probable cause.”  
Andrews v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690, 703 (3d Cir. 2017).   
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to hit him.  Notably, we have emphasized that “[w]hen a police officer has received a 
reliable identification by a victim of his or her attacker, the police have probable cause to 
arrest.”  Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds 
by Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2007)).  Although Montgomery’s claim that 
Tarr hit his head when he fell into a retaining wall conflicts with Tarr’s 911 call and 
Rizzo’s statement that the altercation ended when Montgomery hit Tarr in the head with a 
brick, the probable cause standard does not require officers to correctly resolve credibility 
determinations or conflicting evidence.  Wright, 409 F.3d at 603.  Furthermore, there is 
no “[i]ndependent exculpatory evidence or substantial evidence of [Montgomery’s] own 
unreliability” concerning Tarr’s assault.  Wilson, 212 F.3d at 790.  To the contrary, 
Montgomery’s account of being assaulted by Tarr was corroborated by Rizzo.  And even 
if Tarr acted in self-defense and Montgomery also committed a crime, probable cause 
still existed.  See Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that “an 
affirmative defense to an alleged crime does not necessarily vitiate probable cause”). 
In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Tarr, we conclude that the 
District Court properly granted summary judgment on Tarr’s false arrest and malicious 
prosecution claims on the basis that the corrected affidavit was sufficient to establish 
probable cause.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
